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Roger W Proctor** Individual Enforcement of
Canada's Environmental
Protection Laws: The Weak-
spirited Need Not Try*
An Alberta Example
I. Introduction
It is no secret that public awareness and concern for environmental
protection in Canada has increased significantly in recent years.
Legislators have addressed these concerns by implementing new laws to
regulate the various practices that impact negatively on the environment.
With statutes in hand, environmentally conscious individuals are
beginning to intervene personally to monitor compliance and ensure
enforcement of these new laws.
It is well accepted that laws must be enforced in order to achieve their
purpose. Canadians have generally delegated this duty to the State.
However, mechanisms are in place in this country that enable individuals
to participate directly in law enforcement. Theoretically, an individual
who believes a law has been infringed has two options. He or she may
persuade the appropriate government authority to investigate the
allegation and proceed with the matter. In the alternative, he or she may
lay a private information and thereby personally compel the accused to
stand trial in a court of law. This second option of private prosecution,
once the central enforcement mechanism in British criminal law, is a
statutorily entrenched right in Canada.1
In practice, private enforcement of Canada's environmental laws is
often more apparent than real. It is becoming frustratingly difficult for
those persons who have probable grounds to compel offenders to the
courts if the State has neither the will nor desire to enforce the laws.
What is more worrisome is the fact that this lack of will on the part of
government, arguably often motivated by political forces, is becoming
more prevalent today.
* The author wishes to thank Linda F Duncan, Assistant Professor of Law at Dalhousie Law
School, for her consultation, advice and review of this paper. Her expertise and knowledge of
Alberta Environment law issues contributed significantly to the preparation of this paper.
** Roger W Proctor obtained his Bachelor of Laws degree from Dalhousie Law School in
May, 1990. He is currently engaged in Articles at Macleod Dixon, a Calgary based law firm.
1. See E. Greenspan, Martin's Criminal Code, (1990), s. 574.
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This paper explores individual enforcement of Canada's environmen-
tal protection laws in light of this criticism. The Alberta example of the
Oldman River Dam is used to illustrate just how difficult enforcement
can be if certain factors are present. Very little has been written on
environmental law enforcement in general and private enforcement in
particular. This is curious in light of the current citizen activism in the
area.
II. The Oldman River Dam Case
The Oldman River is located in the southwest comer of Alberta. An
agreement was reached between the Alberta Ministry of the Environment
and W.A. Stephenson Construction Company to build a large dam on
this river, five miles north and two miles east of the Town of Pincher
Creek. The official purpose of this dam was to provide an irrigation
reservoir for agricultural needs.2 On or about July 21, 1988, the natural
course of approximately one and one half miles of the Oldman River
near Pincher Creek became a dry river bed as a result of the diversion
tunnels becoming operational.
Dr. Martha Kostuch, a veterinarian, collected evidence that suggests
the diversion project caused actual destruction to a once burgeoning fish
habitat. As a result, she laid a private information alleging that Mr.
Kenneth Kowalski (Alberta Minister of the Environment at the time), the
Alberta Environment, Ralph McManus (Project Manager with the
Alberta Ministry of the Environment at the time) and W.A. Stephenson
Construction carried on work or an undertaking that resulted in the
harmful disruption of fish habitat contrary to section 31(3) [now section
35(1)] of the Fisheries ActO
The relevant sections of the Fisheries Act state as follows:
35(1)
No person shall carry on any work or undertaking that results in the
harmful alteration disruption or destruction of fish habitat.
35(2)
No person contravenes subsection (1) by causing the alteration, disruption
or destruction of fish habitat by any means or under any conditions
authorized by the Minister or under the regulations made by the Governor
in Council under this Act.
2. as per B. O'Ferral, "The Oldman Dam and Kananaskis Highway Cases" in Resource News
(Apr. 1988) p. 11, atp. 18.
3. Fisheries Ac4 R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, s.35(1).
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40(1)
Every person who contravenes subsection 35(1) is guilty of an offence and
liable
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars
for a first offence and not exceeding ten thousand dollars for each
subsequent offence; or
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years.4
Dr. Kostuch researched section 35(2) conditions and discovered that
no conditions were authorized by the Canadian Minister of the
Environment. She also was unable to find any regulation or Order in
Council respecting that matter.5
On August 2, 1988 the private Information was sworn before a Justice
of the Peace. Thereafter, a process hearing was conducted and process
was issued. The Information was returnable in the Provincial Court of
Alberta on August 30, 1988.
On August 3, 1988 Dr. Kostuch's lawyer wrote to the Federal
Department of Justice and requested that the Attorney General of
Canada assume the conduct of Kostuch's private prosecution and effect
service of each Summons upon the relevant Defendants. 6 The
Department of Justice responded by serving the Defendants but it
requested more information before it would assume the prosecution.7
More information, accordingly, was provided.
On August 18, 1988, the Ministry of Justice indicated that the Federal
Attorney General would not intervene in the case of The Queen y.
Kowalski et aL It stated that, in view of the definition of "Attorney
General" as provided in s. 2 of the Criminal Code and as interpreted by
the Supreme Court of Canada in The Queen v. Sacobie and Paul, it
would not be an appropriate case for such intervention. 9
Section 2 of the Criminal Code states:
"Attorney General"
(a) with respect to proceedings to which this Act applies, means the
Attorney General or Solicitor General of the province in which those
proceedings are taken and includes his lawful deputy, and...
4. Ibi ss. 35,40.
5. This was ascertained through a telephone conference between Dr. Kostuch and myself.
6. Dr. Kostuch has provided several pages of correspondence which serve as proof of these
facts.
7. Ibid
8. The Queen v. Sacobi and Paul (1979), 51 C.C.C. (2d) 430 (N.B.C.A.) affirmed 1 C.C.C.
(3d) 446 (S.C.C.). See especially propositions 5 and 6 at pp. 442-443 of the Court of Appeal
decision.
9. Supra, note 6.
Improving Enforcement of Canada's Environmental Laws
(b) with respect to
(ii) proceedings commenced at the instance of the Government of
Canada and conducted by or on behalf of that government in respect
of a contravention of or conspiracy to contravene any Act of
Parliament other than this Act or any regulation made thereunder,
means the Attorney General of Canada and includes his lawful
deputy.'0
Limerick, J.A. in the Sacobie case, provides the following interpretation
of the above section. With respect to offences that are not criminal
according to section 91(27) of the British North American Ac4 1867," if
an information is laid by the Government of Canada and counsel appears
on behalf of the Attorney General of Canada to conduct the prosecution
he has exclusive jurisdiction. If the information is laid by anyone other
than on behalf of the federal government the provincial Attorney General
may appear and conduct the prosecution. If the information is laid by
someone other than the Attorney General of Canada or the Attorney
General of the province and neither intervene then the private person
may prosecute.12 The Ministry of Justice argues that fisheries matters fall
under section 91(12) of the British North American Act and since the
Information was launched by a private informant the Attorney General
of Canada must defer to provincial intervention.
On or about the same time as the Ministry's response, the Alberta
Attorney General became aware of the Information sworn by Kostuch.
It stated that the provincial Crown intervenes in all criminal matters in
the Province of Alberta that are not within the jurisdiction of the Federal
Attorney General (ie: Kostuch's case).' 3 Furthermore, it was Department
policy that before any criminal matters could be prosecuted an
investigation had to be conducted by the appropriate enforcement
agency. This investigation may be initiated by a citizen making a proper
complaint to that agency and turning over any information in support of
the complaint. Any evidence gathered is then reviewed by the
Department to determine if a prosecution should be conducted.
The Attorney General of Alberta advised that no complaint was made
or investigation conducted by the appropriate enforcement agency.' 4
Accordingly, it planned to enter a stay of proceedings on the prosecution.
Kostuch's lawyer responded by providing evidence of the Fisheries Act
10. Supra, note 1, s.2.
11. Now s. 91(27) of the Constitution Ac4 1867
12. Supra, note 8, at pp. 442-443.
13. Supra, note 6.
14. /bid
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infraction yet the Alberta Crown still stayed the action. Essentially this
meant that the prosecution was suspended indefinitely.
In the case of environmental prosecutions it has been the experience of
private informants that, regardless of the legal basis for their case or the
strength of the evidence collected on their own accord, the [Alberta]
Crown has intervened to stay the proceedings.t5 This has been the
experience regardless of the fact that the documented evidence is often
presented to the Attorney General himself. In Kostuch's case the stay is
particularly regrettable. Arguably there is at least a perceived conflict of
interest when the Attorney General suspends aprimafacie and legitimate
action against one of its own ministries.
As a result of the steps taken by the Alberta Crown Dr. Martha
Kostuch was rendered helpless in her attempt to bring possible
perpetrators of an environmental protection law to justice. Not only did
this have a demoralizing effect on the private informant with a bonafide
case but it also rendered such legislation nugatory.
III. The Canadian Private Prosecutorial System and Its Problems
There exists, arguably, two avenues of exploration with respect to the
state of affairs in the R. v. Kowalski et aL case. First, the provincial level
of intervention should be examined by looking at Crown discretion to
stay private prosecutions and judicial review of this power. Second,
federal responsibility with respect to an alleged fisheries offence should be
explored. Here it is appropriate to look at the possible application of a
mandamus action compelling the Federal Justice Department to launch
an information on behalf of the Attorney General of Canada.
A private prosecution is a criminal action launched by a private
citizen. Private prosecution exists to ensure that violators of the law are
brought l'efore the courts' 6 and it acts as a safeguard in cases where
government fails to enforce the law. The private prosecutor is understood
to be an individual, or group or corporation (other than a public
authority) not acting in any public capacity.17
The statutory authority for private prosecutions concerning fisheries
matters is found in the Criminal Code, the Canadian Interpretation Act,
and the Fisheries Act .18 As stated previously, section 2 of the Criminal
15. L.E Duncan, Enforcing Environmental Law: A Guide to Private Prosecutions (Edmonton:
Environmental Law Centre, 1990) at p. 63.
16. Ibid
17. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Private Prosecutions (1986), Working Paper 52, at
p.l.
18. E. Greenspan, Martin's Criminal Code (1990), ss.2, 574, 579, 795. Interpretation Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21, s. 34(2). FisheriesAct R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, s. 35(1).
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Code defines "prosecutor" as either the Attorney General or, where the
Attorney General does not intervene, the person who institutes
proceedings. A prosecutor may prefer an indictment under section 574 of
the Criminal Code.19 Section 574(3) requires that a private prosecutor
obtain written consent of a judge in cases where the Attorney General
does not intervene. Section 795 provides for the prosecution of summary
conviction offences in a manner similar to section 574. Essentially, then,
the Criminal Code provides the general legislative framework for
conducting the private prosecutions.
The Interpretation Act20, a federal enactment, links the Criminal Code
to the Fisheries AcL Section 34(2) of that Act states:
All the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to indictable offences
apply to indictable offences created by an enactment, and all the
provisions of that Code relating to summary conviction offences apply to
all other offences created by an enactment, except to the extent that the
enactment otherwise provides.21
Since the Fisheries Act is a federal statute the Criminal Code applies to
that Act unless something in that Act states otherwise. Section 40 of the
Fisheries Act 22 provides the option of proceeding by way of indictment
or summary offence. There are no provisions that transcend the standard
prosecutorial provisions of the Criminal Code.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada has set out the procedure for
laying a private information, taking into consideration the above
legislative framework233 In order to lay a charge the informant must have
reasonable and probable grounds that an offence has been committed. He
or she need not have been a witness to the set of events comprising the
offence. As well, he or she need not be a victim of the crime.
19. Supra, note 1.
s.574(I)
Subject to subsection (3) and section 577, the prosecutor may prefer an indictment
against any person who has been ordered to stand trial in respect of (a) any charge on
which that person was ordered to stand trial, or (b) any charge founded on the facts
disclosed by the evidence taken on the preliminary inquiry, in addition to or in
substitution for any charge on which that person was ordered to stand trial, whether or
not the charges were included in one information.
s.574(3)
In any prosecution conducted by a prosecutor other than the Attorney General and in
which the Attorney General does not intervene, an indictment shall not be preferred
under subsection (1) before any court without the written order of a judge of that court.
20. Supra, note 18.
21. IM4 Interpretation Act, s.34(2).
22. Supra, note 3.
23. Supra, note 17, at pp. 6-7.
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The Justice is obliged to receive the information if all of the formal
requirements are met. This Justice is empowered to issue process where
he or she considers the case to be reasonably founded. Essentially his or
her power is discretionary.
If the informant has met all of the above procedural requirements he
or she can elect to proceed with the trial himself or herself or try to
persuade the Attorney General to intervene and prosecute. In R. v.
Schwerdt24, Wilson, J. confirms that a private person has the right to
"keep the ball rolling" should the Crown fail to intervene in the case. In
that case she held, "The fact is that such a prosecution may be permitted,
and indeed, must be permitted, unless prohibited by statute. '25
If the Attorney General does decide to intervene it can do so in three
ways. It may elect to pursue the prosecution, withdraw the charge, or
enter a stay on the proceedings. These three options are examined in
detail later in the paper. It is important to realize that should the Crown
intervene the private informant loses standing to continue the prosecution
privately.
If the Attorney General elects to pursue the prosecution, as was
requested by Kostuch in the Oldman River case, then the private
informant is relieved of the burden of proving the offence. As well, the
informant will have the satisfaction of knowing that the process is being
carried out to final judgment on its merits.
If the Crown intervenes to withdraw the charge, presumably due to the
lack of evidence, then there is no charge remaining on the record.
Essentially such an action has the effect of ending the proceedings. In
order to continue the prosecution a new charge would have to be laid.
The case law suggests that the Crown's right to withdraw is an unfettered
one. Kirby, J., adopting the decision in R. v. Allen, held, "The
constitutional prerogative of the Crown is entrusted to the law officer of
the Crown, who, on his own responsibility, determines whether a
prosecution shall go on or not; and this court has no right or power to
interfere in the matter."26
The third option available to the Crown, the power to stay an action,
is, arguably, a very powerful and severe one. The Attorney General
elected to pursue this option in the Oldman River case. Here, the Crown
has no obligation to inform the informant of its actions; it need not give
reasons for entering the stay; and its decision has historically not been
24. R. v. Schwerdt (1957), 27 C.R. 35 (B.C.S.C.).
25. Ibid at p.46.
26. R. v. Leonard (1962), 37 C.R. 374 (Alta. S.C.), at p.380. Kirby, J. quotes Blackburn, J.
in R. v. Allen (1862), 121 E.R. 928.
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reviewable by the courts. The only remedies available to the private
prosecutor wishing to question the stay is to have the matter raised in the
provincial Legislature or federal Parliament.27 Otherwise, according to
the authority of R. ex rel McNeil v. Sanucci28, the informant can swear
another information and hope that it too does not get stayed. Neither of
these remedies has been terribly successful in Canada. 29
The statutory authority for staying an action is found in section 579 of
the Criminal Code. That provision states:
579(1)
The Attorney General or counsel instructed by him for that purpose may,
at any time after any proceedings in relation to an accused or a defendant
are commenced and before judgment, direct the clerk or other proper
officer of the court to make an entry on the record that the proceedings are
stayed by his direction, and such entry shall be made forthwith thereafter,
whereupon the proceedings shall be stayed accordingly and any
recognizance relating to the proceedings is vacated.
579(2)
Proceedings stayed in accordance with subsection (1) may be
recommenced, without laying a new information or preferring a new
indictment, as the case may be, by the Attorney General or counsel
instructed by him for that purpose giving notice of the recommencement
to the clerk of the court in which the stay of the proceedings was entered,
but where no such notice is given within one year after the entry of the
stay of proceedings, or before the expiration of the time within which the
proceedings could have been commenced, whichever is the earlier, the
proceedings shall be deemed never to have been commenced.30
It is clear that section 579 provides the Attorney General with a very
wide and sweeping power. It is frustrating that it fails to codify any
requirements that must be met in order for a stay to be warranted. Is it
designed simply to provide the Crown with an absolute discretionary
power, or is it designed with the intent of suspending specific repugnant
prosecutorial processes?
Regardless of intent, in Re Dick3t, Leiff, J. held that section 490 [now
section 579] of the Code applies as early as the preliminary enquiry stage
of the prosecution. More recent cases have held that the power to stay
can be exercised as soon as process is issued.32 Furthermore, the manner
27. Supra, note 15.
28. R. ex reL McNeilv. Sanucc [1975] 2 W.W.R. 203 (B.C. Prov. Ct.), at p.206.
29. The Legislative Debates on or about May 19, 1988 concerning the Diasbowa Paper Mill
proposal, another project of environmental concern, and Alberta's history of liberal use of the
stay of proceedings power illustrate just how futile these options are.
30. Supra, note 18, s.579.
31. ReDick, [1968] 4 C.R.N.S. 102 (Ont. S.C.), at p. 109.
32. See Dowson v. The Queen, infr, note 33.
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in which the Attorney General exercises his discretion in this regard is not
properly reviewable by the courts. The rationale for this position is that
the Attorney General is the representative of the Queen. As such, he or
she will, at all times and in all circumstances, exercise his or her powers
and discretion in a manner consistent with an honourable servant of Her
Majesty. The Crown is assumed to be unbiased and just in the decisions
it makes. Therefore, it should not be subjected to judicial scrutiny that
may interfere with its ability to carry out its duties. Rather, the Attorney
General and his or her agents are answerable only to the legislature in the
province where he or she operates.
It is interesting that the Canadian case law has historically reflected
Leiff, J's interpretation of section 579. Only recently have some
lawmakers questioned the practice. Dowson v. The Queen33 is a case in
which the appellant laid informations before a Justice of the Peace
alleging the commissions of indictable offences. Prior to the
commencement of the process hearing, the Attorney General stayed the
proceedings pursuant to the authority under section 508 [now section
579] of the Criminal Code. The appellant sought judicial intervention to
compel the hearing of the informations. The Supreme Court of Canada
agreed that a stay should not be entered before a Justice decides whether
or not to issue process. But more importantly, Lamer, J. hints at the
severity of section 579 and how courts should be more sensitive to the
rights of private informants. He states:
The power to stay is a necessary one but one which encroaches upon the
citizen's fundamental and historical right to inform under oath a Justice of
the Peace of the commission of a crime. Parliament has seen fit to impose
upon the justice an obligation to 'hear and consider' the allegation and
make a determination. In the absence of a clear and unambiguous text
taking away the right, it should be protected. This is particularly true when
considering a text of law that is open to an interpretation that favours the
exercise of that right whilst amply accommodating the policy
consideration that supports the power to stay.34
Although Lamer, J. fails to consider the merits of entering a stay on the
case in general, he has travelled down a relatively uncharted path by
upholding the citizen's right to at least present evidence to determine if
process should be issued. Now that the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms is firmly rooted in our legal system it has been speculated that
judicial review of Crown discretion with respect to staying of actions
stands a greater chance of success. It is suggested that the Charter,
33. Dowson v. The Queen, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 144.
34. !bia at p. 155.
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requiring review of executive action against normative concepts, will
encourage and impel judges to reconsider their role in controlling
prosecutorial conduct that falls strictly within the letter of discretion, but
that nevertheless offends some basic notion of justice and fairness.35
In reality, the case law does not reflect these predictions. Three cases
illustrate just how hesitant judges are to intervene and use Charter
provisions (namely sections 7 and 15) to curtail Crown discretionary
powers. There are common themes running through each of these cases.
In Campbell v. Attorney General of Ontario36 the plaintiff requested a
declaration that the stay of proceedings directed by the Attorney General
for Ontario in respect of seven counts of procuring a miscarriage is void
and of no force and effect. The plaintiff alleged that the Attorney
General's actions are inconsistent with sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.
Craig, J. asserts that the allegations in the statement of claim did not
support any reasonable cause of action whereby the plaintiff has been
deprived of his personal Charter rights.37 Accordingly, the plaintiff does
not have standing to seek review of prosecutorial discretion of the
Attorney General. The judge continues by citing R. v. Moore et aL38 He
states that if every exercise of discretionary authority by the Attorney
General were reviewable, our criminal law system would be in a
shambles. Finally, Craig, J. finds that there was no evidence to suggest
the Attorney General failed to uphold the law or that he was acting out
of improper motives or for an improper purpose.
It should be noted that this case arose in the midst of an appeal of the
Morgentaler case before the Supreme Court of Canada. Accordingly,
there were, undoubtedly, strong policy pressures for the judge to honour
the Attorney General's stay of proceedings until the abortion issue could
be settled.
The Hamilton case39 provides a more alarming example of the court's
position on Crown discretion. Here, the petitioner is a special-interest
group called Life Force. It alleges three summary conviction offences
under section 402 of the Criminal Code relating to wilful infliction of
unnecessary pain upon a dog. After the issuances of the summons but
before the appearances of the three accused, an agent of the Attorney
General of British Columbia entered a stay of proceedings in the matter.
35. D.C. Morgan, "Controlling Prosecutorial Powers - Judicial Review, Abuse of Process
and Section 7 of the Charter" in (1986-87), 29 Cr.L.Q. 15, at p.16.
36. Campbell v. Attorney General of Ontario (1987), 31 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. H.C.).
37. kid, at p.296.
38. R. v. Moore et al (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 474 (Man. C.A.).
39. ReHamilton andthe Queen (1986), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (B.C.S.C.).
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Life Force raised two issues: whether the Crown has the power to stay a
summary conviction proceeding commenced and prosecuted by a private
prosecutor; and whether the Crown's right must be exercised in
accordance with principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the
Charter. McKenzie, J. concludes:
The Crown does have the discretionary right to intervene in criminal
matters, and having done so, to stay a private prosecution. Stated
conversely, a private prosecutor does not have a legal right or liberty to
continue a prosecution in the face of Crown intervention. The traditionaljustification for this Crown prerogative is the presumed objectivity and
impartiality of the Crown as contrasted to that possessed by individuals or
special-interest groups.40
He also finds that the petitioner's section 7 argument fails. "The fact is
that this individual's liberty given this broad definition, does not free him
to continue a prosecution when he is met by the Attorney General's
direction to enter a stay of proceedings. An exception could arise where
clear evidence to support some flagrant impropriety on the part of Crown
officers but no such suggestion is made here."'4'
That case provides an interesting illustration of one judge's perception
of special-interest goups. He does not address the issue of whether or not
there is substantial evidence to support the charges laid. Rather, he
assumes that the Attorney General has a better grasp of what is just than
does Life Force. Is this a valid assumption to make? Arguably it is not.
Why not settle the matter by trial on its merits rather than suspend the
proceedings in this manner?
In Re Baker 42 the petitioner's six year old daughter and younger
brother were hit by a motor vehicle. The daughter died. There were five
independent witnesses in the accident. Based on witnesses' statements and
police reports, Crown counsel decided that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, the defendant
was charged with careless driving. The petitioner, not being satisfied,
attended before a Justice of the Peace and swore an information alleging
dangerous driving. The Justice conducted an exparte hearing and issued
process. Less than one month later, the Crown entered a stay of
proceedings on the private action. The petitioner then claimed section
15(1) of the Charter renders section 508(l)[now section 579] of the Code
ultra vires only in so far as it relates to private informations. The
petitioner argued that he was deprived of his right to equality before the
law.
40. bi4 at p.66.
41. 1bi, at p.69.
42. ReBaker and the Queen (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 123 (B.C.S.C.).
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Toy, J. held that there is nothing in section 508(1) that indicates an
unevenness of application to individuals or groups.43 He concludes that
even if there was a prima facie infringement of section 15(1), the
Attorney General's action would be saved by section 1 of the Charter.
Toy, J. states:
The policy consideration that I consider of significance here is whether a
private prosecutor's right to prosecute should be an unfettered one. In the
recent past, counsel acting on behalf of the Attorney General in our
criminal courts have been discharging their responsibilities with firmness
and practical objectivity that has generally served our communities
satisfactorily. The prospect of the loss of that attribute of objectivity
convinces me that no such change is necessary at this time.44
Finally, the recent case of Rudolf Wolff & Co. v. Canada 45 illustrates
the notion that the Crown cannot be equated with an individual. The
Crown represents the State, and constitutes the means by which the
federal aspect of our Canadian society functions. In situations similar to
the one at hand the Crown is not an individual with whom a comparison
can be made to determine whether a section 15(1) violation has occurred.
In light of this case it is, at least, arguable that an individual would not
be successful in a Charter challenge with respect to section 579 of the
Criminal Code if it is argued that he or she is unequal before the law vis-
a-vis the Crown.
These cases reflect the belief that the Crown has exercised its discretion
prudently in the past so it will continue to do so in the future. As a result,
the courts have maintained a hands off approach. Although lip service is
paid to a possible different ruling in the event the Crown has engaged in
some flagrant impropriety, there seems to be no judicial evaluation of
what constitutes such an impropriety.
In the Oldman River case Crown conflict of interest is alleged.
However, in light of the case law, it may be difficult to convince a court
that the Attorney General is capable of exercising its discretion contrary
to the public interest. More frightening, it may be difficult to convince a
court that it should review the matter at all.
A system of private prosecution can be justified in terms of both
society's interest in increased law enforcement and the individual's
interest in vindication. In the field of environmental law, full participation
by the citizen as a private prosecutor is required to compensate for the
public prosecutor's improper action and inaction. However, in light of the
position of the courts generally and the attitude of the Alberta Attorney
43. bid, at pp. 127-128.
44. bia at p.128.
45. Rudolf Woff& Co. v. Canada, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 695.
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General specifically, it is quite possible that Canada's institution of
private prosecution is in jeopardy. From an historical perspective, it is
quite ironic that the principal purpose of private prosecutions was to
provide a check on public authority with respect to the criminal process.
IV. An Historical Look at Private Prosecutions
The foundations of our prosecutorial system are rooted in Britain. Unlike
Continental Europe's attitude of deference to public authority, the British
common law tradition was one of hostility towards monopoly -
government or otherwise. The most important aspect of British criminal
prosecution was the fact that the entire system was founded upon the
assumption that the responsibility for preserving the peace and bringing
the offender to justice was one which belonged to each and every
member of the community.46 Thus, although the justice which was
dispensed was the King's justice, its invocation depended almost
exclusively on the initiative of the private citizen as victim or
complainant. Accordingly, if the private victim or complainant did not
initiate and conduct the prosecution of an alleged offender there would
normally be no prosecution.47
It was in the context of this early system of criminal justice that the first
traces of what were later to become the offices of the Attorney General
and Solicitor General of England were to be found. It is not difficult to
predict that a system based exclusively on private prosecutions could
present difficulty. What happens when victims become intimidated or
pressured into remaining silent? Does the public interest not have a stake
in who is or is not prosecuted?
The state, through the King's attorney, assigned itself a limited role of
direct intervention only in those matters in which the sovereign had a
particular interest. For the most part, this intervention took one of two
forms. Prosecutions could be initiated and conducted by the sovereign;
or, in cases initiated by private informants, the Crown could terminate
the proceedings prior to their conclusion. The rationale for this activism
emanates from the Sovereign's prerogative as the 'fountain' of royal
justice.48
It was at this point that the "nolle prosequi" power (translated; "I am
unwilling that it should be prosecuted") surfaced in the common law.
The exact origin of this precursor to the power to stay actions is
46. P.C. Stenning, Appearingfor the Crown (1986), at p.14.
47. Ibid, at p.14. British history reported in this section has been taken principally from this
Source.
48. Ibid at p.17.
Improving Enforcement of Canada's Environmental Laws
unknown. However the first recorded use of the "nolle prosequi" was in
1555.49 The rationale for this power was to eliminate charges that were
cleary frivolous or vexatious. It was a highly controversial tool exercised
by the Sovereign. In practice it was seldom used.
Therefore, until the mid-nineteenth century the following procedure
for trial was in place.50 Charges of criminal offences, laid principally by
private informants, were submitted to a grand jury of 23 men at each
quarter session. These charges were submitted through process of
committal for trial issued by a Justice of the Peace. The grand jury heard
the accusations of the prosecutor and witnesses and then deliberated to
decide whether the case was "ignoramus" or "a true bill". If the jury
decided it was a legitimate charge (ie: not frivolous or vexatious) then it
endorsed the process and the case proceeded to trial. During the course
of this process, the Sovereign could intervene to enter a "nolle prosequi".
This was done only in a handful of cases.
In 1879 England codified the Sovereign's right to intervene. The
Prosecution of Offences Act did not establish a general system of public
prosecution. Rather, it was designed to act in cases which appeared to be
of importance or difficulty or in which special circumstances, such as a
person's refusal or failure to proceed with a prosecution, appeared to
render the action of the Director of Public Prosecutions necessary to
secure the due prosecution of an offender.51 The important point is that
the legislation which created the public prosecutor was, like the earlier
legislation, a corrective measure designed to shore up the existing system.
The legislative intent was not to overturn private prosecution but to
supplement it.52 In fact, the Bill specifically states this idea.
Through the years there has been a very real erosion of the private
prosecution power base adopted by Canada. This is illustrated in both
this country's legislation and practice of government. "Prosecutor", as
defined by the Criminal Code,53 provides the presumption that the
prosecutor is the Attorney General. Only if he or she fails to intervene
does a private informant gain that status. Secondly, in Alberta, the
Attorney General states explicitly that it is the policy of its department to
intervene in all criminal matters.54 Furthermore, it will stay all actions
49. Nit at p.26. A more detailed examination of the "nolle prosequi" can be found in
Stenning's book.
50. This procedure is taken from Stenning's book. See /bid, starting at p.13.
51. Supra, note 17, at p.36.
52. !bid at p.42.
53. Supra note 18, s.2.
54. Supra, note 6.
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that are not investigated by Crown agencies. That policy completely fails
to recognize a private prosecutor.
Arguably, Canada has changed direction completely away from its
traditions to a new course of virtually absolute public prosecutorial
intervention. The problem in changing direction so drastically, is that the
new system does not provide the related safeguards found in a system that
has been in place for many centuries. For example, in France individual
citizens have not been permitted to prosecute criminal matters
individually.55 Rather, they have been given three functions. They may
report the crime to a public authority; they can join in a trial as a civil
party; and, if the public prosecutor elects not to prosecute, the victim or
complainant can seek redress. The option of bringing the civil action
illustrates that the state's attorney is not completely in control. He or she
cannot extinguish a public action by refusing to prosecute.56 Clearly,
there is not such a mechanism available in Canada. Even if there was, the
power to stay, as it is currently designed, would probably override it.
Among the major western legal systems, West Germany's system is
unique in its concern with controlling prosecutorial discretion. The
Germans have isolated the elements of the problem, and they have
implemented legislation to limit or exclude prosecutorial discretion.5 7
The public prosecutor's monopoly is explicitly created by statute in
Germany. The Code of Criminal Procedure outlines three remedies
available to private interests in the event that the sovereign fails to
prosecute. First, section 374 provides for private prosecution of a narrow
class of eight misdemeanors dealing mainly with the protection of private
dignitary and private property rights. These offences are trespass to
domestic premises, insult, inflicting minor bodily injury, threatening to
commit a crime upon another, unauthorized opening of a sealed letter,
inflicting property damage, patent and copyright violation, and crimes
proscribed by the unfair competition statute. If the prosecutor exercises
discretion under section 153 to refuse to prosecute the victim may still
prosecute. This prosecution is not conditioned on the public prosecutor's
refusal to act as it is in France.58
Second, for more serious crimes, citizens may request an administra-
tive and judicial review of the public prosecutor's exercise of discretion.59
55. Supra, note 17, at p.4 2.
56. Ibi4 at p.42.
57. J.H. Langbein, "Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany" (1974), 41 U. Chic. L.
Rev. 439, at p. 439. "Prosecutorial discretion" here means the power to decline to prosecute
in cases of provable criminal liability.
58. Ibid, at pp.461-462.
59. bid at p.462.
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This procedure is called "Klageerzwingungsverfahren". Section 152(2) of
the Code provides that the public prosecutor shall take action against all
judicially punishable acts, to the extent there is a sufficient factual basis.
Accordingly, anyone is entitled to make a formal demand to the
prosecutor asking him to prosecute in a particular case. If the prosecutor
still declines to prosecute he must notify the complainant of this decision
and explain the reasons. If the complainant is the victim of the crime and
he or she is unhappy with this explanation he or she may seek
departmental or judicial review. The state supreme court has original
jurisdiction in these cases.
Third, an individual has the right to launch a departmental complaint
against the prosecutor. Unlike the experience in Canada, such complaints
have a major impact. Langbein says that most prosecutors endeavour to
become judges. Complaints are not conducive to enhancing a prosecuting
career so these persons attempt to avoid controversial situations.60
V. Recent Canadian Developments
Since Canada now places a great deal of importance on public
prosecutions perhaps it would be wise to consider developing a scheme
similar to that of West Germany. Should there not be some procedure to
compel the Crown to provide reasons for invoking section 579 of the
Code; and should there not be some method of comprehensive judicial
review to determine whether those reasons are bona fide? By having such
a system in place citizens could enforce Crown accountability. At the
very least, as Stenning suggests, Canadian law reformers should draft a
complete and clear set of provisions outlining all of the circumstances in
which a criminal proceeding can be terminated by prosecutorial
authorities.61 This would assist the judiciary in its task to better evaluate
whether or not the Crown is exercising its discretion contrary to the
public interest.
Interestingly, a recent Law Reform Commission report has endorsed a
greater role for private prosecutions in Canada. What is curious about
this report is that it's recommendations completely fail to address the
Attorney General's discretion and the power to stay. It would appear that
the Commission has neglected to examine the reality of widespread stays
of actions. By failing to do so, it missed a golden opportunity to put forth
constructive recommendations that would strengthen the private
prosecution institution.
60. bid at p.466.
61. Supra, note 45, at p.36 4.
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The Law Reform Commission states:
It is our belief that a criminal justice system that makes full provision for
private prosecution of criminal and quasi-criminal offences has advantages
over one that does not. In any system of law, particularly one dealing with
crimes, it is of fundamental importance to involve the citizen positively.
The opportunity for a citizen to take his case before a court, especially
where a public official has declined to take up the matter, is one way of
ensuring such participation.62
It continues:
... we have concluded that, as nearly as possible, the private prosecutor
ought to enjoy the same rights as the public prosecutor in carrying his case
forward to trial and ultimately to final disposition on appeal. This is a
modest proposal but an important one, since it underscores our belief in
the value of citizen/victim participation in the criminal justice system and
serves to reinforce and demonstrate the integrity of basic democratic
values.63
The Commission finds that offences relating to environmental quality are
the sort of quasi-criminal offences that may be ripe for increased
prosecution by individual citizens or special-interest groups. But,
although it recommends that the private prosecutor ought to enjoy the
same rights as the public prosecutor in carrying his or her case forward,
it states, "All of the foregoing recommendations are subject to the right
of the Attorney General to intervene in any prosecution in order to carry
the case forward, or stay the proceedings, or withdraw the charges." At
no time does the Commission provide a set of criteria that should be
followed by the Crown when it considers to stay an action.
In summary, the case law, commentaries, and the state of Canada's
procedure with respect to the system of private prosecution suggests that
Martha Kostuch stands a very slim chance of success if she were to
request judicial review of the Alberta Attorney General's decision to stay
her private action. It would appear that she must demonstrate that the
Crown exercised its discretion in a flagrantly abusive manner. This is not
an easy task when there exists no criteria to evaluate such manner.
Although she could illustrate how unfair the current state of the law is
relative to that of other countries, the success of such a policy argument
in court is questionable at best.
VI. Mandamus Action
As mentioned earlier, the second avenue available to Kostuch is to bypass
62. Supra, note 17, at p.3.
63. /bid at p.4.
64. Ibid, atp.31.
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the Provincial Crown and convince the Federal Justice to intervene to lay
an information and proceed to prosecute the matter. As was illustrated in
the Sacobie case the authority of the Attorney General of Canada to
institute and conduct quasi-criminal offences is entrenched in the
Criminal Code. If the information is laid at the federal level that level has
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. Essentially the provincial Crown is
frozen out in those circumstances.
It is now recognized that public law has a positive and not merely
negative aspect.65 There are occasions when justice can be done not by
preventing government from acting but by compelling it to act in a
particular manner. Enforcement of the legal duty to enforce the law is
regarded as one of the principal objects of the writ of mandamus.
The prerogative writ of mandamus is a discretionary remedy not
usually granted in situations where another remedy is available.
Historically, it has been quite an onerous task to obtain such an order.66
The rationale was to prevent the appeal of every questionable exercise of
administrative discretion. However, in light of current demands placed on
government, there is a resurgence of consideration of this option.
There are four essential aspects of mandamus.67 First, in order to have
standing to seek such an order, the consensus of judicial opinion demands
that an applicant illustrate he or she has some legal right which he or she
cannot enforce or enjoy unless the respondent performs his or her legal
duty. Traditionally, the applicant had to demonstrate that this legal duty
was owed to him or her personally. It is suggested that there is now a
departure from the "purely for the benefit of the subject" concept. Rather,
one has standing if the goal is the advancement of justice.68 This idea is
illustrated in R. v. Commissioner of Police; Exparte Blackburn.69
In that case Denning, M.R. held that the applicant had standing to seek
the writ if he had a 'sufficient interest to be protected'. He interprted this
to mean that a householder would have a sufficient interest, entitling him
or her to seek a writ against his or her local police chief, if that officer
issued an instruction forbidding prosecution of persons alleged to be
housebreakers. Furthermore, it would be fantastically unrealistic to
expect the applicant to undertake the financial burden of launching a
65. AJ. Harding, Public Duties andPublic Law (1989), at p.vii.
66. See Harding, Ibid
67. R.S. Tracy, E.I. Sykes, Cases and Materials on Administrative Law (1975), at pp. 18-20.
Tracy presents a good overview of the criteria courts look at when they grant a mcndamus
order.
68. Supra, note 64, at p.196.
69. R. v. Commissioner ofPolice; Exparte Blackburn, [1968] 2 Q.B. 118.
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private prosecution. Therefore, the private prosecution was not
considered an alternate remedy ripe for not granting a mandamus order.
Second, the interest of the applicant must be real or genuine and not
merely one which is colourable. In other words, the applicant must not
have ulterior motives for requesting the order.
Third, as a matter of courtesy, courts occasionally decline, in the
exercise of their discretion, to issue a mandamus against an official who
is ready, willing and anxious to perform his or her duty but has
misconceived it.70 Finally, where the duty which has not been performed
is one which requires the exercise of discretion, mandamus will not issue
to compel the discretion to be exercised in one way rather than another.71
It will issue simply to compel the discretion to be exercised.
The general perception of the law on mandamus is one of confusion.
Since the remedy is discretionary courts have, arguably, based their
decisions on a visceral reaction rather than on a sound legal argument. In
other words, "A citizen's action has in practice been allowed to develop,
almost by conspiracy, because of the beneficial results which accrue from
such actions. Yet among all the high-flown language of the judges there
is hardly anything which provides a sure legal basis for a citizen's action
to enforce a public duty."72 Accordingly, a responsible individual or
interest group with a genuine concern cannot be assured of success at
achieving standing for mandamus.
One case that offers hope to an otherwise uncertain situation is
Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture.73 In that case the relevant statute
established a milk marketing scheme. This scheme provided for a
committee of investigation which had the duty, if the Minister in any case
so directed, of considering and reporting to the Minister certain
complaints concerning the operation of the scheme. The producers in one
region were unhappy that the differential factor in price fixed for their
region was outdated because of increased transport costs. They
complained to the Minister but he refused to act, arguably because he
might be obliged to act on a finding in favour of the complainants by
overriding the Board's decision. The Minister did, however, concede that
the complaint was relevant and substantial. The House of Lords granted
mandamus compelling the Minister to consider the application according
to the law. The Court held:
70. Supra, note 66, at p.20.
71. as per A.J. Harding. See Ibid at p. 20.
72. Supra, note 64, at p. 20 4.
73. Padfieldv. Minister ofAgrculture, [19681 A.C. 997 (H.L.).
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The Act imposes on the Minister a responsibility whenever there is a
relevant and substantial complaint that the board is acting in a manner
inconsistent with the public interest, and that has been relevantly alleged
in this case. I can find nothing in the Act to limit this responsibility or to
justify the statement that the Minister owes no duty to producers in a
particular region.... So long as it does not act contrary to public interest
the Minister cannot interfere. But if it does act contrary to what both the
committee of investigation and the Minister hold to be the public interest
the Minister has a duty to act.74
The difficulty arises in establishing what constitutes the Attorney-
General of Canada's duty. If the duty is simply to exercise discretion
regarding the laying of a charge then it is questionable whether Kostuch
can compel the federal Crown to actually lay an information and
prosecute the alleged perpetrators. Section 41(4) of the Fisheries Act
states:
s.41(4)
Notwithstanding that a prosecution has been instituted in respect of an
offence under section 40, the Attorney General of Canada may commence
and maintain proceedings to enjoin anything punishable as an offence
under that section.75
This provision does give the Attorney General of Canada a certain degree
of discretion by including the permissive word "may".
An argument involving the "semantic approach" might be useful in the
present circumstances. 76 It is suggested that a simple enabling provision
may in practice prescribe a pattern of behaviour. In a case of "if X, then
A may do Y" there may be a duty, whether express or implied, to
investigate the relevant matters (for example, whether X exists or if X
exists, whether A ought to do Y). Secondly, a proper construction of the
provision may entail a duty to exercise the power if the circumstances
warrant it. Except where the entire scheme is intended to be optional,
there must be situations in which the legislation intended that the power
in question should be exercised. In conclusion, the fact that a discretion
is given cannot mean that the donee is entitled to exercise it in such a way
as to flout the very purpose of its being conferred. For this reason a power
can become obligatory, especially where the conditions for exercising the
power take the form "if A is satisfied that X, then A may do y,,.77
Although the semantic approach makes good logical sense, it is not
known at this time whether the courts will accept it. It does seem
74. Supra, note 64, at p.20 .This case is cited by Harding.
75. Supra, note 18, s.41(4).
76. Supra, note 64, at p.17. See Harding for a more detailed explanation of the 'semantic
approach'.
77. kid at p. 17.
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ludicrous to suggest that, when there exists a comprehensive legislative
scheme to protect fish habitats, when there exists solid evidence of the
active destruction of one such habitat, and when there appears to be
provincial refusal to intervene and insure compliance of the Act, the
Attorney General of Canada does not have a bare duty, under s. 41(4),
to exercise its discretion in favour of prosecuting the alleged offenders.
Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of a mandamus action, this
approach may be a viable alternative to Kostuch's pursuit of private
prosecution.
VII. Conclusion
Clearly, it is very difficult for concerned individuals to actively enforce
environmental protection laws. The weak-spirited need not even try. For
it is often long, complicated, and a distressingly disappointing ordeal.
Persons such as Dr. Martha Kostuch should be commended for their
enthusiasm and determination in the pursuit of environmental protection.
It is perplexing to discover that these people often stand alone in bringing
environmental offenders to justice. Although governments have
developed comprehensive legislation, they have neither the ability nor the
will to enforce these laws. Inevitably, these circumstances raise the
fundamental question: What is the purpose of law if it is not enforced?
Author's Note:
Dr. Martha Kostuch is still actively engaged in her attempt to privately
prosecute the alleged offenders of the Fisheries Act On July 25, 1990 she
laid new informations. On October 18, 1990 an application was made by
the Attorney General of Alberta to quash these informations alleging
abuse of process. Fradsham, Prov. Ct. J. decided that there was no abuse
of process. Dr. Kostuch is now scheduled to appear before Fradsham,
Prov. Ct. J. on May 21, 1991 to have process issued. This process hearing
date is subject to an appeal launched in the Alberta Court of Queen's
Beach by the Attorney General of Alberta. Dr. Kostuch has also
launched mandamus actions, the details of which are not known at this
time.
